

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED FOR RELEASE AS SANITIZED BY *ST/11/36* ON 6 July 95

ATTENTION.—Access to top secret material is limited to those individuals whose official duties require such access. Each officer or civilian who receives and/or releases the attached top secret material will sign this form and indicate the date of handling and sign his full name in the proper column. Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should sign full name before further routing.

FN 47

FROM: _____ CONTROL NO. 006

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S FULL NAME	COMMENTS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
()	12	May		<i>Re. spec 1</i>	<i>Bybat / PB Success</i>
()					<i>By Hand</i>
()					
()					
()					<i>K-Program File</i>
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

Job # 79-01025A

Box # _____

Folder # 002

Total # CIA DOCS. HEREIN _____

Document No. _____
 No Change in Class. ☐
☐ Declassified
 Class. Changed to: TS S ☒ 1989
 Next Review Date: _____
 Auth: HR 70-3
 Date: 20 June 1979 By: 665

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL/RYBAT/SECRET~~

()
TS-006
Copy 4 of 8

LINCOLN

Chief of ()

K-Program

cc: C()

() - First Meeting

Attached is the report prepared by () regarding his first
meeting with ()

()
4 May 54
Distribution:
2-LINCOLN
2-Wash
()
2-Files
()

~~CONFIDENTIAL/RYBAT/SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

27 April 1954

1. I have been sent to you by a G resistance movement, dedicated to destroying communist influence in this country. It is the only resistance organization of its kind.

2. Men and women from all walks of life, all professions, all social strata, have sunk their personal, political and religious differences, for the purpose of uniting under the leadership of X and Y. They have relegated any doubts regarding the professional competency of X or Y in order not to dissipate the strength of the G resistance potential. Any split in leadership would dangerously weaken the G resistance potential and thereby play into the hands of communism.

3. X and Y are being helped and advised by public spirited, influential and wealthy Americans who do not hold office. These Americans are not associated with business interests in G. They are politically and financially independent and have no selfish personal stake in the future of G. They are not operating under U.S. Govt instructions. It can be assumed, however, that the U.S. Govt which is firmly resolved to see G communism destroyed by all methods short of outright intervention, would not disapprove of their activities as long as it does not become involved.

4. The junta strives for one objective and one objective only: the destruction of communism in G. There are no other objectives motivating it. X and Y have not been required by their American friends to make political or economic concessions in exchange for American help. Conversely, the Americans have not committed the United States Govt to any specific course of action once G is free again. In particular, the U.S. does not stand committed to support any political faction, let alone any individuals, in quest for political power. The political complexion of G will have to be determined by the Guatemalan people and its chosen representatives. The same applies, without reserve, to the treatment to be accorded to foreign business interests in G.

~~TOP SECRET~~

5. The junta has been planning and preparing for over a year now. One of its problems has been to prevent well-motivated G's from striking prematurely and provoking a second Salama. So far the Junta has been successful in this and its control over all resistance elements in G is getting stronger by the day. The junta is determined not to allow itself to be rusted or provoked into any ill-conceived ventures. The order to strike will be given as soon as chances of success clearly outweigh prospects of failure -- and not one day sooner. The junta is anxious to avoid prolonged bloodshed and relies upon the impact of manifest and overwhelming power to enforce communist surrender.

6. I am not acquainted with the junta's planning, and to the best of my knowledge no one inside G is. The junta is aware of the hazards of premature leakage and has taken elaborate precautions to prevent it. I happen to know that the so-called revelations of the White Paper were not in any way related to the activities of the junta. I also know for a fact that the plans of the junta do not envisage an invasion of G which would undoubtedly rally all nationalist elements -- even those who abhor communism -- behind the defense of G soil.

7. In recent weeks an increasing number of prominent individuals known to be in the G government's camp, have been approaching the junta in order to protest their unswerving opposition to communism and to offer their help. These offers in most instances are likely to have been prompted by a realization that the day of reckoning may not be far off, or they may have been instigated by the G government for purposes of provocation. The junta is resolved not to accept any recent converts whose political past stamps them as rank opportunists at best and communist fellow-travelers at worst. In determining where these individuals stand, the junta depends upon the judgment of X and Y. No one will be accepted as an active collaborator who does not enjoy their complete trust.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

8. The junta has all along considered you a man sympathetic to its objective. It is confident that in any emergency it can call upon you for active help. Your past is a matter of public record and few G's in responsible position have been as forthright and courageous in stemming the communist tide, as you have been. Both X and Y share in feelings of the highest personal regard for you. The junta realizes that your range of activity in its behalf is of necessity restricted. It would have been irresponsible to get you involved in conspiratorial activities of a routine nature. The time has now come where the junta may need your advice and help and where unavoidable risks will have to be taken.

9. The junta has instructed me to put to you the following question:

Are you prepared at this time to receive a personal representative of X and Y in order to discuss specific issues of great importance on which the junta requires your help and advice?

Brief handed to ()

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1. In compliance with LINCOLN instructions, () upon arrival in Guatemala, took immediate steps to contact () The groundwork had been laid by Guatemala Station in developing () to the point where he indicated willingness to assist us in the development of this project. Without () unstinted support and without the information he supplied, the operation would have been fraught with incalculable hazards. He has proven a highly intelligent, trustworthy and courageous companion, the embodiment of a type of ideologically motivated career agent of whom our agency has alas too few. For a man whose personal roots are deep in the soil of his country () () he has launched into this perilous enterprise in an impressive spirit of self-abnegation. We trust that the agency, although no formal commitments have been made or requested, will take cognizance of a moral obligation to shield him and his family against harm and discrimination.

2. The basic concept underlying our resolve to contact () and, if possible, to enlist his support in pursuit of the objectives of PEM SCPSA, was predicated on conclusions derived from a careful analysis of the assets which () claims to control in Guatemala. While the debriefing of () lent sustenance to CA MILERIS' claim to be in control of some of the military garrisons, it yet failed to provide a final and conclusive answer to our quest for substantive information. Prevailing conditions in Guatemala City fail to augur for a swift and bloodless investment of the capital. No claims have been advanced by CA MILERIS to the effect that he is in control of any important segment of its military establishment. For planning purposes we must therefore assume that the armed forces will give combat to the insurgents, unless factors can be brought to bear, inducing the Army either to

stand by or to rally to the uprising.

8. It is believed that the strategy of FROCCOENS encompasses the possibility of a prolonged and sanguinary struggle for the capital. Its rapid fall would no doubt clinch victory in the whole of Guatemala and assure one of our main objectives - the radical elimination of the militant functionary corps of the CP. An attempt had therefore to be undertaken to bring under Junta control those Army units stationed in the City which must be expected to serve as the government's obedient tools in quelling any uprising: The Guardia de Honor, the unit stationed at Aurora Air Field and the Base Militar. Failing this, a further attempt had to be made to enrol ranking officers of the Army High Command, on the assumption that they may conceivably be in a position to countermand the orders issued by the President, or issue conflicting orders, or influence officers under their command to rise in rebellion. A penetration of this level of the armed structure may now have been accomplished as a result of our dealings with () If all goes well, a faction within the highest level of the Guatemalan officers' corps stationed in the city may align itself with the uprising provided the initial impact of local successes, particularly in the provinces, bids more than fair to lead to success. We cannot, however, hold out much hope, that such a dissident faction will be prevailed upon to coordinate its moves within the framework of FROCCOENS for reasons which will become apparent in our account of what () had to say. Any hopes we may entertain will furthermore have to be based on the expectation that normal command channels within the Army will not at the first sign of local unrest be superseded by an emergency setup, shunting off from the exercise

of direct command the very elements on whose support we may be counting.

4. As an attachment to this report you will find written instructions

handed to () as a guide in his first exploratory contact with ()

You will note that these instructions are substantially in line with thoughts on the subject put forward by LINCOLN. It was our purpose to acquaint

() in as condensed and intelligible a form as possible with the salient elements of PBUCCESS without, on the other hand, giving away vital secrets.

5. In determining what could be conceded, we were influenced by a variety of factors. The circumstances in which the first meeting had been laid on did not bear any of the hallmarks of an ambush, nor did () antecedents suggest that he might lend himself for that purpose. There was in our hands evidence, though incomplete, that his mind had for some time been preoccupied with problems involved in unseating the regime. In an atmosphere saturated with rumors of impending revolt or invasion, any presentation, in form or content reminiscent of prevalent rumors, or in his mind conjuring up the recollection of previous false alarms or abortive coups, might have nipped our enterprise in the bud. This analysis was borne out by the genesis of our talks, inasmuch as () was indubitably most impressed by the fact that the uprising was presented to him as firmly planned, with no major deviations acceptable and with inexorable drive behind it.

6. In the light of previous unconfirmed reports, we had prepared ourselves for exception being taken to the role played by GALLERIS. What we were not prepared for was the violence and complete inflexibility with which those exceptions were subsequently voiced. He did, however, decide

to meet the problem frontally in order to let no misunderstanding come up as to the firmness of our resolve to hold on to CALLIGERIS. (Any concessions subsequently made in deference to () aroused feelings, were purely tactical and did not affect the substance of our relationship with CALLIGERIS.)

7. We further, as it turned out rightly, anticipated that the questions of CALLIGERIS' personal and political ambitions would come up in one form or another. The point was therefore made in the strongest terms that no political commitments had been asked of us, let alone had been proffered. Most of the points raised by () in his first talk with () are self-explanatory and will therefore be dealt with under subsequent headings. It should be stressed that () was able to read the statement verbatim, having briefed himself previously on the exact meaning of all technical impressions, so that for the purposes of your evaluation the brief can be accepted as having been communicated in toto and understood by () in all material detail.

8. In order to meet () objections to CALLIGERIS, we resorted to the adoption of a terminological distinction between "consejo" and "junta" which may not have the merits of logic but which, we believe, was of some help in getting away from personalities and focussing on the essentials of the problem. The "consejo", as we explained it to () in our meeting on April 29th, is a super-council, composed only of four powerful, independent American individuals, playing the role of a court of appeals as it were, and passing on all important decisions with finality. As distinct from the "consejo", there is the "junta", composed of the same four Americans, plus CALLIGERIS and () this time in capacity of co-equals. Then there is

a large staff of technical advisors, both American and Guatemalan, which give counsel to both the "consejo" and the "junta". CALLEGHERIS thus occupies a dual position: he is a member of the "junta", one of six members to be exact. And he is Chief of Staff and senior military advisor and planner (S-3), serving under (not in) the "consejo" and in all his moves answerable to the "consejo". While this presentation of the organizational structure may in one way detract from the concept of a predominantly indigenous leadership, surrounded by American advisors and backers, it was meant to serve (and may actually have served) as a device to place CALLEGHERIS' position in a prospective more palatable to () and his friends. In theory at least the "consejo" would be in a position to curb CALLEGHERIS' political ambitions should he try to launch them in the vehicle of his military position. In theory also the "consejo" could establish military and political contacts in the target area, without necessarily cutting in the "junta".

9. () position was explained to () in his first meeting with () as that of a representative of CALLEGHERIS and () implying membership in the "junta". Subsequently this version was tacitly dropped and replaced by a more convenient legend, making () one of the many technical advisors with a specialty in political affairs, which turned out to be an altogether satisfactory backdrop. The contradiction apparently went unnoted. In the end, with no noticeable transition, () emerged as a representative of the "consejo", making a completely independent approach, thus avoiding all direct tie-in with either CALLEGHERIS or () We trust that this latter version will linger.

10. Turning to the actual course of events, short mention should be made of a brief and distasteful interlude which brought under consideration the use of () as an initial go-between. What weighed with us in this choice was the certain though impounded, belief that () in fear of a possible government provocation attempt would immediately raise the issue of authenticity and that the intercession of an individual known by () as occupying an official position would put to rest any apprehensions. We were confident that this could be done without even by implication involving the United States Government (a carefully devised legend taking care of that aspect). A brief prepared for () excluded all matter which could conceivably be considered controversial and all doubts on that score had been allowed for by emasculating () legend to the point where he had little more to do than to introduce an American who dislikes communism. This notwithstanding () who had noted a distinct chill in relations between himself and his erstwhile "friends" since he had last visited the country, began to develop cold feet -- a term which charity rather than accuracy impels us to select. Not wanting to/even the remote risk of losing () through inept handling, we decided not to avail ourselves of () services. Since his usefulness to K-Program was considered ended, he was sped out of the country. Any blame, if it attaches, should go to () whose assessment of () operational potential turned out to be inaccurate. With () having become available we believe that fate was kind when it held us back.

11. The meeting between () and () on 27 April 1954 was laid on by () after the idea had been discarded to venture a completely cold approach. () is thus aware of the fact that there has been a

meeting between () and () but what transpired has not been vouched for to him - at least not by (). The latter is satisfied that () harbors genuine hostility against communism and all its works, and that he is not an instrument of deception or provocation. Since he was all along the source of information concerning () we were in a position to check on the accuracy of his reporting and it is fair to state that we had been reporting the truth. He will of course infer that something is in the wind and is likely to probe for further information. We console ourselves in the thought that before this thing is over there are liable to be other and more devastating leaks.

12. The meeting between () and () was scheduled for 29 April 1954. As a meeting place the () town house of (), at present unoccupied, was selected. () spent the night prior to the meeting in one of Antigua's hotels and was picked up in the X-Program operational car, chauffeured by () with () sitting next to him in the front seat. After a short introduction, () using the name (), the group proceeded to the meeting place. There were no signs of hostile surveillance. The conversation took place in (), () The meeting lasted from 9:00 a.m. to 4 p.m.

13. () started off by telling () that, following his invitation, he had come to Guatemala and that he considered a great honor indeed to meet face to face one of Guatemala's staunchest anti-communists. () added that there were a few persons in leading positions in Guatemala whose invitation he would have accepted or whose invitation he would have considered an honor.

The preambular part having been settled, () launched into a concise discourse, reiterating the substance of what () had already communicated to (). There were some indications that the previous briefing had sunk in and that the ground had been well prepared. The issue of accreditation never came up and () showed little hesitancy in disclosing his deep and abiding hostility to the regime and his deep resentment at the mesalliance it had entered with communism.

14. () (), struck () as "muy simpatico", but hardly endowed with superior brainpower. Without having such background in sizing up latins, () would describe him as the typical product of a military school, ridden by the taboos and narrow prejudices which such upbringing is bound to inculcate, in a country where opportunities for intellectual self-development are limited. This notwithstanding, () seemed to have undergone the kind of political schooling which the hectic history of modern Guatemala provides for all those who become involved in politics.

15. While time did not permit to delve into his personal and professional past, () inferred that () played some role in the conspiracy which resulted in SBJCO's fall and which installed the quadrumvirate. Although it is difficult to fathom the ideological roots of his belief, his hatred of dictatorship appears to be strong although it may not be matched by an equally fervent desire to see a parliamentary democracy installed in his country. There can be no doubt whatsoever as to his hatred against communism and the public record of his past bears testimony to the fact that it is more than academic. His falling out with () which is probably final

and irreparable, may not have been over the communist issue alone. Certainly they may now be considered irreconcilable political antagonists, with no illusions left on either side. (

16. There can be no doubt that () wants to keep ()
() at close range ()

() It can
safely be assumed that ()
() his access to classified information is limited to what
he can learn through his numerous close friends still in responsible position.

17. In order to size up () properly and in order to determine his potential in any conspiracy, it is important to view him as a professional officer first and foremost. He has risen in life with and through the Army and everything he has accomplished he owes to it. Owner of a ()

() is bound to be a man of wealth who could live in easy comfort without a position in public life. Whether his () is inherited, or whether - like so many of his fellow-officers - he managed to make a fortune on the side, was not ascertained. Being a capitalist of some consequence he cannot possibly view the degradations of communist economic theory and practice in Guatemala with equanimity.

18. The basis for () opposition to communism must be looked for in his military upbringing which, even today, is the predominant environmental influence conditioning both thought and action. It is also doubtlessly the cause for a noticeable ambivalence in his reasoning if it comes to rationalizing what he refers to the "conqueteria" of some ranking officers with communism, and especially if he tries to explain the phenomenon of ARBENZ. There is no doubt in his mind that the Army (and in the context of our discussions this term never connotes the enlisted ranks) is predominantly anti-communist - 95%, as he repeatedly stated. Even those ranking officers whom he listed as firmly committed to the support of the regime are "anti-communist". Whereas () obviously recognizes the ambiguous position in which the officers' corps has been placed as a result of communist penetration of the governmental structure, he is inclined to look for the root of the evil in the acts and beliefs shared by at most four ranking officers in key positions and he obviously regards the President as the key to the problem. () strongly implied that he considers the overthrow of the regime, with the President firmly in the saddle and in a position to exercise effective command over the armed forces at the time of the uprising (an even temporary absence from the capital would in

() opinion, afford him and his associates in the () a

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

sufficient

/breathing spell to wrest control from the President), would make prolonged and bloody strife unavoidable, because - as he stated repeatedly - ARBENZ is going to fight and will go down fighting.

19. While it is quite impossible to weave () statements concerning the Army into a consistent and intelligible pattern of predictable behavior, certain of his observations evince that he has a shrewd and discerning mind when it comes to fathom the motivation of some of his friends and colleagues and his analysis of the situation, while hardly a masterpiece of cogent reasoning, deserves scrutiny.

20. By way of introducing the main topic of conversation, () presented () with the following estimate of the situation:

The "junta" believes that it is in effective control of a sufficient number of garrisons to be able to launch a military uprising at any time with considerable likelihood of success. The undertaking has been carefully planned and nothing been left to chance. A massive and timely supply of material is assured. The "junta" will have at its disposal a well-organized communications net, independently of locally available communication facilities. Teams of experts are undergoing training and will descend upon Guatemala at the appointed time, to discharge a variety of functions. (In answer to () question what percentage of the ranking officers in the various garrisons could be considered as under "junta" control, () denied any knowledge, but ventured as a rough guess, that it might be between 40 and 60% -- an estimate that left () visibly impressed.)

21. It should be stressed that the foregoing presentation was not an impromptu affair, but carefully weighed in the light of a number of pertinent

~~TOP SECRET~~

factors. From a security point of view, it was felt that in case of disclosure to unauthorized persons, only the element of strategic surprise could conceivably suffer, the element of tactical surprise being left unimpaired. Another factor, allowing considerable latitude in divulging the training of specialists for specific tasks, was conditions by the realization that this phase of our preparations has already been subject to considerable compromise and that nothing much would be added to what the government already knows. The mention^{as} of 1954 the period during which the Junta would be striking, left the actual date sufficiently vague and yet served the immediate purpose of imbuing() with a sense of urgency. The mention of control in the garrisons was an indispensable prerequisite for entering into any fruitful discussion of substantive issues, such as control over the Army as a whole and the role of Guatemala City and the Army units stationed therein. The cumulative effect of the disclosures, as far as they went, was felt to be one of counteracting the paralysis of will which is known to have affected a great many militant anti-communists as the result of too many futile hopes raised in the past. (In this context, it appears significant, that() declined() invitation to talk things over, one of the reasons being that he frankly disbelieved the account of events to come).

22. From a psychological point of view, transcending the immediate purpose of getting() to cooperate, the plan in its above version can therefore inflict but little harm, should it be divulged to unauthorized persons, and is bound to lift the morale of those whom it may concern. It is worth noting that() in the course of the conversation harked back at least four times to the emphatic statement made by() that no circumstances known to the Junta could possibly

result in a postponement or abandonment of the uprising, requesting each time that his understanding be confirmed. It is an impression, shared by () and () that this one statement did more to sway () than any other issue raised during the conversation. A further illustration of the pivotal importance of this particular issue is that () suggested a meeting between () and () for the primary purpose of assuring the latter that we were engaged in serious pursuit and that our singleness of purpose would not be deflected by any setbacks.

23. We had known from previous reports that () would not be party to an invasion of Guatemala. We had no difficulty in convincing him that an invasion was not in the cards and that the basic doctrine guiding our strategic planning was inextricably linked up with an overthrow of communism through Guatemalan effort. () anticipated the raising of this issue and emphatically stated that an invasion was bound to rally Guatemala's best elements in defense of her soil, nullifying all our efforts to vitalize homegrown resistance and in effect making Guatemala ripe for a major communist assault under the guise of defending her national interests against the foreign invaders.

24. It was felt that the involvement of Americans in prominent positions called for some explanation in order to remove the stigma of American intervention. It came as rather a surprise that () himself did not raise this point and in fact did not seem to pay any particular attention to this part of our presentation. In () case, at least, American preoccupation with events in Guatemala did not seem to cause any surprise or resentment whatsoever. () by way

of introducing the issue, referred () back to the Caracas resolution which had served the dual purpose of rallying all member nations behind a determined effort to keep communism out of the hemisphere and of serving notice that the United States would not stand idly by should such infection come to pass. () pointed out that developments in Guatemala constituted a serious threat not only to Guatemalan independence but to United States security and that the United States, faced with the grim prospect of involvement in a major war could as a matter of elementary self-preservation not afford to ignore the inroads of communism into the governmental and administrative structure of Guatemala.

25. Going beyond this, () stated that the United States would do everything in its power by methods short of direct intervention or short of economic pressure, to help the Guatemalan people to get rid of its unwanted lodgers. The "consejo" therefore, though operating outside the walls of direct governmental control, was acting in the sure knowledge of implementing United States foreign policy. In answer to a question put by (), he was given assurance that the "consejo" was not linked with the State Department and in fact on occasion () had disagreed with the State Department over specific policies and moves. The groundwork having been laid by () in elaborating on the role played by private individuals and privately owned and controlled institutions in the promotion of public causes (Radio Free Europe, Ford Foundation etc.), () left us with the impression that our explanation was satisfactory to him. The unspoken premise that the "consejo" while primarily devoting itself to promoting the cause of

Guatemalan freedom, also considered itself charged with the protection of vital United States interests in seeing normal conditions return to Guatemala as quickly as possible must have further strengthened () conviction that the Americans mean business.

26. As had been anticipated, the CALLIGERIS issue loomed large in our conversation. In reporting on his first talk with () () had summed up his impression by stating that in his opinion "the key to the whole situation was () emotional statement that he would do anything if he could, but that it is impossible to ally himself or collaborate with CALLIGERIS and that he had reached an irrevocable decision on the matter." In voicing strong detestation of CALLIGERIS and in declining any offer of collaboration with him, () claimed to be speaking also in behalf of all the other officers whom he counts among his friends and fellow-conspirators.

27. It is not possible at this stage to convey to you a very clear picture of the strength of this group and of what level in the military hierarchy is occupied by it. () was purposely vague in identifying his friends and we for obvious reasons did not see fit to press him at this stage. Both in his talks with () and with () made veiled reference to a group of Guatemalan officers who are bound by mutual oath to strive only for the good of Guatemala. In talking about this to () he pointed with a dramatic gesture to his safe and stated: "their names are in here." He further stated that this oath bound each of them to kill any member of the group who violated it. He specifically mentioned that ARDELL was not one of those who had taken the oath. () asked () never to mention to anyone the existence of this group, nor the oath that bound them. This notwithstanding, he brought up this subject again in the presence

of () this time in order to underscore the point that he could not possibly be party to any plot involving the necessity of liquidating any one member of this group. He particularly stressed that they were all united in a strong feeling of anti-communism, but evaded answering the question what would happen if one of them threw in with communism. () considers it possible that (), in stating that any collaboration with CALLIGERIS would, in the eyes of his "friends," make him a man without honor and that he would lose any influence which he is still exercising among them, may have been referring to the above-mentioned group. He did imply that () belongs to it and that he shares his strong dislike of CALLIGERIS.

28. From stray remarks made by () there emerges a pattern of conflict that is only too familiar to students of the morphology of personal strife ⁱⁿ a tightly knit and caste-conscious society, such as a corps of professional officers. Added to this in the case of CALLIGERIS should be the fact that the formative years of his military career fall into a particular turbulent area of Guatemalan history, where violently and irreconcilable enmities were the order of the day and had to be incurred as a prerequisite for political and often physical survival. It may be best to present to you a number of the reasons given us by () to explain why collaboration with CALLIGERIS is out:

ASSASSINATED

29. CALLIGERIS associated himself with Colonel ARAÑA, an officer who had reached his colonelcy through the ranks. Being an officer of the line and not a graduate of the Escuela Politecnica, ARAÑA systematically degraded and insulted military school officers, favoring and promoting officers of the line. In this he was aided and abetted by CALLIGERIS, a product and former superintendent of the Escuela Poli-

~~TOP SECRET~~

tecnicia himself. This threatened to destroy the esprit de corps of the officers. In this connection () with considerable bitterness, referred to the fact that he and his fellow-officers had to recognize as their commander-in-chief an old man who could neither read nor write, General REYES. () stated that even today there is a deep-seated struggle going on between Escuela Politecnica graduates and line officers, with the former holding the upper hand and intending to keep it. () observed that CALLIGERIS' removal from the scene had been of considerable help in assuring the supremacy of military school elements. In speaking about ARANA, () expressed pleasure that he had been killed and emphasized that ARANA was engaged in a conspiracy to gain power for himself.

30. () claims that he was almost the victim of a murder plot, conceived by ARANA and engineered by CALLIGERIS. The reason why it failed to come off was that the assassins () () () decided that caution was the better part of valor. () is quite convinced that CALLIGERIS was behind this.

31. At the time CALLIGERIS launched his attack against the (), the officer in charge was () () (), his second in command (). At the time of the attack, () and () had to bear the brunt of the attack. As^{is} well known, a terrific slaughter took place and () was wounded. What do you think () would be () reaction today were he asked to make common cause with CALLIGERIS?

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

32. (

33. (

)CALLIGERIS,

() stated that he was striving for just one goal and that if there was a trench in front of him and he would have to fill it with corpses, he would do so. () cited this incident as an example to underscore his contention that CALLIGERIS would shrink from nothing to achieve his own personal ends in any contest.

34. By way of explaining why a point of honor was involved in their refusal to have any truck with CAL IGERIS, () also brought up the point that an Army court composed of the ranking officers of the Army High Command had passed on CALLIGERIS' conduct and had declared him unworthy to be an officer in the Guatemalan Army. We gather that this point was made by () to imply that at least the officers who made up the court of honor can hardly be expected to eat their own words as it were and submit to the leadership of a man whom they had stripped of military honors.

35. In the context of discussing what contribution () and his associates could render in hastening the fall of Guatemala City, () again brought up the problem of CALLIGERIS, asking what assurance they could be given that once Guatemala was firmly in their hands, CALLIGERIS would not decide to continue the uprising. Further questioning brought out the fact that () was convinced that CALLIGERIS and the elements under his control would proceed to occupy Guatemala City as the seat of political power, regardless of

whether ARBENZ at that time was still in effective control or in the meanwhile had been ousted by Army elements. () was unimpressed by the argument that the issue of political power and the political ambitions of CALLIGERIS are completely beyond the pale of Junta jurisdiction and that CALLIGERIS himself had never raised the issue. () very emphatically stated that this proved nothing and that he was absolutely sure that CALLIGERIS was bound to be harboring personal ambitions far beyond the elimination of communism.

36.() pointed out that it was the considered policy of the "consejo" to leave the choice of Guatemala's political leadership to the Guatemalans themselves. If in the free play of political forces, CALLIGERIS would come out on top, the "consejo" would certainly not raise objections, this being a clear vindication of its own choice. If, on the other hand, the Guatemalan people decided not to elect CALLIGERIS and to entrust their political fortune to someone else, that was all right too. () did stress that the "consejo" was adamantly opposed to the establishment of a reactionary military dictatorship, but that did not mean that the "consejo" would arrogate to itself the right to dictate Guatemala's form of government.

37.() stated as his own personal opinion, emphasizing again that this matter had never been a topic of discussion, that if it should become clear that CALLIGERIS was using his military position to impose himself upon Guatemala as a dictator, not affording the Guatemalan people any opportunity to make known its own preferences, some remedial action might possibly be taken and could effectively be taken inasmuch as the "consejo" was exercising logistical control.

~~TOP SECRET~~

However, () added, in all our dealings with CALLIGERIS we had never discerned any symptoms of consuming political ambition which, if existent, it would be impossible to conceal completely. On the contrary, we had found CALLIGERIS at all times dedicated to the sole objective of eliminating communism in Guatemala.

38. In order to clarify () stand on the CALLIGERIS issue, he was asked the following leading questions:

A. Would he at this stage advocate that the "consejo" jettison CALLIGERIS, even if this would mean abandonment of the whole enterprise? The answer was that we could not very well be expected to do so, although our choice was regrettable.

B. What would be his action, should (as an academic example) a garrison commander come to him for advice on how to react to the approaches of a CALLIGERIS emissary, asking him to make common cause with the insurgents? This question () refused to answer outright, because - as he put it - a "point of honor" was involved. The rebuttal that a "point of honor" could hardly arise as long as the future of his country and the destruction of communism were involved, did not appear to move him. This more than any other incident convinced () and () that the CALLIGERIS issue is so loaded with irrationalism that a man with () limited capacity for self-analysis and for logical development of thought cannot possibly be expected to resolve it within himself.

39. In order to enable you to view in its true perspective what effective contribution () and his friends can render it may be in order to set forth some of the ideas that guided () in developing this information. When asked point-blank what he had to offer, () replied that he and his "friends" could get into the

act only at the 11th hour, i.e. only after the uprising had started and was showing signs of success. In other words - () stated - we would be able to count on him once the revolution had succeeded. He heatedly replied that he had been scheming against communism long before () ever appeared on the scene and that he did not feel he owed us apologies. When pressed for a closer definition of "the 11th hour", he rather vaguely hinted that the ensuing chaos might enable him and his friends to wrest effective control of the Army from ARBENZ and - more specifically - that they might be able to induce certain Army units in Guatemala City not to quell a civilian uprising.

40. () pointed out that, whereas any contribution along those lines would be most welcome, its prospect was much too vague to entrust the capture of Guatemala City to him and his friends. He as a professional staff officer would appreciate that for the purposes of strategic planning that kind of an offer might as well not be made at all. () further stated that he did not wish to conceal from () that the problem of "Guatemala City" was of grave concern to the "consejo", because there was at this stage no assurance whatsoever that the armed forces stationed in Guatemala City would rise concurrently with the garrisons in the provinces. In other words, we had not been too successful in effecting penetrations of the command of those Army units on a sufficiently high level to warrant any optimism whatsoever in predicting whether they would throw in their lot with the rest of the Army.

41. () deliberately painted a dark picture of the military situation in Guatemala City for the purpose of eliciting () military views on the situation and ~~up 1944~~ what effective

control over this situation they might be able to exercise. It was felt that nothing would be given away by such admission, because () could be presumed familiar with conditions prevailing in the capital and might have been able to show up unfounded boasts. Furthermore, this type of information if getting into the wrong hands would merely serve to lull the government in a false sense of security as regards the situation in Guatemala City. () strove to convey to () that the local situation in Guatemala City, and more specifically the strong control exercised by ARBENZ and his most trusted henchmen over the Army units stationed there, offered a wide field of activity to him and his friends, but not on an 11th hour basis.

42. () successfully drove home the point that the Junta could only disengage itself from immediate concern with military conditions in Guatemala City if there was some tangible assurance that he and his friends were effectively engaging themselves in the defection of those army units. In the absence of such intent or of success along those lines, the Junta would have to cope with the situation in Guatemala City in its own way, committing those, mostly civilian assets, which it now has and ultimately investing Guatemala City by military force brought up from the provinces. We were fully conscious that the latter necessity might spell the prospect of prolonged and bloody civil war, with Army units fighting Army units, a prospect which we are determined to face without flinching. () finally mentioned that this solution would also place CALLEGUIS in effective control of all of Guatemala, as far as we are concerned a secondary consideration, but probably of a little more concern to () and his friends.

43. () added that he personally saw some merit in the concern expressed by () that CIA might have strong political aspirations, although the "consejo" failed to share this view. Be that as it may, () was sure that the "consejo" would not object to an Army coup engineered by () and his friends. He should, however, bear in mind that the mere replacement of ARBENZ by a man like () with FORTNEY still lurking in the antechamber, would not be then considered an acceptable solution of the communist problem and that our plans would therefore have to be implemented as scheduled. () indicated that he was in full agreement with this point of view.

44. While () repeatedly tried to convey the impression that "they" (meaning him and his associates), had a "plan", it can be stated that they probably confined themselves to debating a number of possibilities without ever reaching a firm conclusion, let alone ever getting to the point of trying something. On the basis of his talk with () is convinced that a precipitate move on his part need not be apprehended, because there is at this stage nothing to move with. It may help your own evaluation to be presented with some of the ideas which () brought up in the course of our conversations.

45. When first asked by () to tell him what sort of thing he had in mind to bring about the downfall of the government, () remarked that economic pressure would do the trick, because the Guatemalan government had during the past year run up a deficit of \$14,000,000.00. () pointed out the trouble with that argument was that the price of coffee had reached such a high point that not only would Guatemala prosper, but the government would probably collect

next year \$25,000,000.00 in taxes as opposed to \$8,000,000.00 last year. Furthermore, the gold backing of the quetzal was so strong that the government, without weakening the internal value of the currency, was capable of printing paper money against its gold reserves. Therefore, while the basic idea was good, it simply did not fit into the monetary situation of the country. () in commenting on economic pressure as a solvent of the situation, pointed out that this would be tantamount to an abandonment of the policy of non-intervention and that once that decision had been made the more effective remedy would be to send troops. This, however, would not be the kind of remedy the United States wanted. It would not serve to create the atmosphere in which each individual feels responsibility in a local, national and world-wide sphere.

46. After () had read to () the statement dealing with the inadvisability of an invasion, () - while agreeing that this was a point well taken - stated that "they" had been hoping an invasion would take place, because the Army could take advantage of the ensuing chaos and take over the government. He was sure that the syndicates and camoesinos would step into the breach. He conceded that an invasion (by an Army of mercenaries) appeared a rather fantastic notion, but that its impact, if tried, might propel the Army into action.

47. A more realistic approach to the over-all problem of revolutionary strategy became discernible after () had outlined to () the basic concept of PESQUERESS. () was visibly impressed by what he was told, especially by the stress placed upon winning over the ranking officers in the various garrisons and to start from there. He indicated that this, in his opinion, was an

eminently sound approach. Once it had sunk in that any realistic contribution by him and his friends would of necessity have to be conceived within the framework of the RESISTANCE concept, he began thinking along lines of practicable strategy and more productive vistas of fruitful collaboration began opening up. What developed will be discussed under the heading of "Guatemala City."

48. () repeatedly stated that a defection of the command of the Army units stationed in Guatemala City would meet with the greatest difficulties, the reason being that the key positions are occupied by officers irrevocably committed to upholding the ARBENZ regime against all comers. Both () had been given assurance by the President that he would support their presidential aspirations. With this carrot dangling before them, it was out of the question that they would jeopardize their political future by entering into any kind of conspiracy. () turn were in cahoots with the commanding officer. (), who with either () in the presidency could count on advancing into the position of Chief of the Armed Forces and Chief of Staff, respectively. () repeatedly emphasized that the defection of the aforementioned officers was completely out of the question and that no inducement, material or otherwise, could possibly sway them in their determination to obey the demands of the President. () () () controls also the Guardia Civil through his henchman Colonel ERNEST Var. We did not discuss the position of the Base Militar although a remark made by () (the exact contents of which we fail to recollect) leads us to believe that one of its ranking officers may belong to the circle of () trusted friends.

U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

49. In answer to the question on how many ranking officers () could absolutely depend upon in an emergency, he stated that there were three of whom two were absolutely safe. Without wanting to identify who they are, he stated that they should obviously not be looked for among the aforementioned group of officers and that only one of them exercised troop command. Inasmuch as one of the three is undoubtedly (), there remain two unidentified. It should be stressed in this context that we were only talking about officers stationed in Guatemala City, not below the rank of regimental commander or deputy commander and of the Army High Command. There can be little doubt that among the officers bound by a common oath there must be many more whom he could point out to us as defectible.

50. The whole problem of what to do about the Army in Guatemala City is in ()'s mind tied up with the homogeneity of the Army command and with the fact that in his opinion the Army is 95% anti-communist. The thought therefore that any uprising may entail internecine strife, with Army units fighting each other and with subordinate officers assassinating their superiors (some of whom may be the very officers committed by special oath to defend Guatemala), is clearly abhorrent to them. He repeatedly tried to elicit information as to how the "junta" proposed to cope with that contingency and whether our plans called for the systematic elimination of certain officers believed unsympathetic. Back of his mind may be lurking the suspicion that under the pretext of enlisting the Army support, CALLIGERIS is planning to conduct a private purge on the side, eliminating all Army officers who could conceivably stand in the way of his political aspirations. () stated that he was not aware of any such plans and that while in some instances officers may have to be removed, this would most likely be the exception rather than the rule. Most of them, () was sure, would be swept along by the momentum of the revolution.

51. () position vis a vis ARBERZ is a highly complex one.

()
() claims that
at 2-hour in 1944, ARBERZ was two hours late and CALLIGERIS left town that day. Eight men were involved in the conspiracy. ()

~~TOP SECRET~~

he has still some affection left for ARBENZ. About six months ago ()

() asked him to chair a commission ()

() called () and asked him
to inform () he would not accept the position because he would
not work with communists. ()

52. Both () and () are of the opinion that () has been
driven into a state of utter exasperation and that his friendship for the Presi-
dent has worn thin. Again, however, it does not appear that () has thought
out the problem to its logical conclusion. On the one hand he argued very
forcefully that that the physical presence of ARBENZ in Guatemala City was
bound to militate against a bloodless coup. On the other hand he very in-
sistently tried to elicit from () what plans if any had been laid to dispose
of the ARBENZ issue. () evaded a straight reply by pointing out this problem
was closely tied up with the overall problem of Guatemala City and, after all, it
was the underlying purpose of the "consejo" approach to () to learn
what he and his associates were thinking about it. () added that, if he were
a Guatemalan, an answer to ()'s question would not cause him any particular
qualms. () specifically stated that to the best of his knowledge the issue
ARBENZ had not so far been taken under advisement by the "consejo" and he was
under the impression that, in the absence of all indications to the contrary,
its solution one way or the other was not considered a prerequisite for success.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

53. () considered it inadvisable to discuss the problem in concrete terms for a variety of reasons:

A. This happened to be one major issue not included in the guidance provided by LINCOLN for our dealings with ()

B. The breach between () and ARBENZ at this stage may not have fully crystallized and any indication that the President's physical elimination is part of the "junta's" plans (associating this in () mind with CALIGERIS' personal intentions), might weaken his resolve to fully associate himself with our cause.

54. There can be little doubt that the assassination of ARBENZ has been a subject of discussion between () and his friends. From his remarks it was impossible to draw any inference as to the conclusion they eventually reached. () statement: "You of course realize that without ARBENZ there would be no communist problem in this country", may have been meant to furnish the cue. ()

~~TOP SECRET~~

55. () strong feelings in regard to what he referred to as the "dignity of the Army" came out when () stated that the part of the public feels that the Army should do something about the present situation, even if this involved giving up its special privileges, rather than waiting to get in on the spoils of an inevitable uprising. () answer was that the Army, except for a few, were among the most selfless servants the nation has. Their salaries had not been raised in spite of the rising cost of living and the majority are living from hand to mouth with no reserves to draw on. In this connection () very heatedly commented upon scurrilous attacks launched by an Army paper, put out by a group of political refugees in Honduras, attacking the Army in a manner designed to destroy the faith of the public and to weaken the control of the officers over the ranks.

56. Only passing references were made to the existence of a civilian resistance organization in Guatemala and particularly in the capital. () assured () that there was a powerful and numerous resistance organization, the strength of which it was impossible to estimate, the reason being that it is not too well organized as yet. () proceeded to state that big strides were being made by its Guatemalan leaders to tighten up the internal security and the discipline of the individuals associated with it. The "junta" was confident that the civilian underground would give an excellent account of itself during the uprising. Quite likely it would be the initial assault by civilian elements in Guatemala City putting the spark to the powder keg. From all available indications there would be an uprising the like Guatemala had never witnessed in its history and its very impact might conceivably suffice to convince ARBENZ that the game was up.

57. () dwelt at length upon the importance of bringing all public

life to a complete standstill as an effective means of forcing the resignation of the government. He intimated that this was another aspect which he and his friends had been giving considerable thought. Especially the paralysis of all means of transportation would render a decisive contribution to bringing down the government. Again () protested ignorance of what had been planned along those lines and reiterated that the main emphasis of the "junta's" plans was on military action, with all other considerations being subsidiary; if he and his associates could see any effective means of bringing about such a paralysis of the transportation system, the "consejo" would be more than happy to take their plans under advisement.

58. () stated that the arming of the campesinos and of the sindicatos caused him and his friends considerable alarm. He claimed that a recent trial mobilization in Esquintla proved that the communists might be able to rally on very short notice in that area alone as many as 12,000 armed campesinos. He was sure that these forces would be mobilized and committed should there be an internal uprising or an invasion would beyond the shadow of a doubt join in the fracas. () asked () what provisions the "junta" had made to cope with that contingency. () reiterated that he had no knowledge whatsoever of any tactical moves that may be contemplated by the "junta". He could not imagine, () averred, that the "junta" had failed to make the necessary provisions to thwart the effective commitment of paramilitary effectives in Guatemala City or in any other strategic area. Stressing that the following question was a strictly academic one, in no manner reflecting actual or surmised planning of the "junta", () asked whether a strafing attack by planes against the trucks and railroad cars carrying campesinos to Guatemala City would not

with a minimum loss of lives prevent the effective commitment of these partisans. () thought that at least it might result in their temporary dispersal.

59. (), in the course of our conversation, broached the question whether any member of the U. S. diplomatic establishment in this country was cognizant of the "junta's" plans and authorized to speak in the "junta's" behalf. () firmly and emphatically denied this, adding that it would be wise for any Guatemalan actively engaged in conspiratorial activities to give the American Embassy and its members a wide berth. The basic policy decision, however, placing the United States into unyielding opposition to Guatemala's communism and the firm resolve not to allow this cancerous growth to keep festering was known to the American Ambassador and, () was sure, was known to the Guatemalan Government.

60. In discussing ways and means of fitting () and his associates into the framework of the conspiracy, () made the following statements, pointing out that they represented the considered policy of the "consejo":

A. The "junta's" basic strategic concept on how to bring about the liquidation of communism in Guatemala would under no circumstances be subjected to material changes. Too much work had gone into it, too many commitments had been made, too many preparatory steps had been taken -- besides time was running short. No practicable alternative had been suggested which could assure the radical elimination of communism down to its grassroots.

B. There could be only one strategy with the corollary of centralized control. All diversity of effort, all uncoordinated moves, would

merely play into communist hands. The "consejo" could therefore not lend support to any endeavor outside the framework of the "junta's" strategic plans. For that reason also the "consejo" was unprepared to countenance let alone actively support two independent revolutions, one in the provinces and one in the capital city.

C. Without wanting to commit the "consejo" to any such solution, an arrangement could possibly be worked out whereby() and his group would be brought into independent contact with the "consejo" rather than placed under the direct control of CALLIGERIS. A recommendation along those lines would be submitted to the "consejo" as the most effective and probably only means of meeting() strong objections to becoming associated with CALLIGERIS.

D. If the "consejo" approves, a permanent representative in Guatemala will be designated who will be charged with the conduct of all further transactions between "consejo" and ().

E. () will be expected to firm up his personal contacts in the military establishment as expeditiously as possible and to make available to the "consejo" all information that has a bearing on our joint enterprise.

F. The "consejo" in turn through its representative will make available to () and his associates all requisite information of a tactical nature, needed to enable them to coordinate the nature and the timing of their moves with the overall plan of the "junta". It will, whenever this appears appropriate, put () in touch with other collaborators of the "junta".

~~SECRET~~

61. A further meeting between () and (), with () attending and interpreting, has been scheduled for May 5th. At this meeting it is proposed to read to () a formal summation of all the points at issue on which it is believed an understanding has been reached. () will be requested to re-confirm our understanding of his willingness to give his full support to our endeavor, under the aegis of the "consejo" and subject to its orders. He will further be given an oral message to be passed to () to the effect that the "consejo" appreciates the reasons for his unwillingness to agree to a direct meeting with its representative and is loath to endanger his personal security unnecessarily. On the other hand, the "consejo" considers him and has considered him all along an active sympathizer of the movement and will attempt to keep in touch with him via (). The "consejo" trusts that any doubts regarding the genuineness of our effort which he may still be harboring, will be taken care of by the course of events.

62. The next meeting is likely to change and to some extent modify some of the impressions gained thus far, and a supplementary report will be submitted to you. In view of some of the issues raised in this report, it was found advisable, however, to send it forward in its present raw form.

()

~~TOP SECRET~~